Boko Haram: By participating in extremist missions, although deliberately trying to provoke government repression and incite outrage amongst the Muslim community, without mass support it is unlikely they will attract recruits. Repulsion by the people in the region ends up failing to entice second and third generation participants causing “burnout”. Kronin states that “a group may endure, but without demonstrated progress toward its goal, the weight of history is against it: a group’s ideology may be overtaken by their own events.

Al-Qaeda: Their take on jihad isolates a lot of people in the region who support pieces of their ideology but not to the extent of killing innocents. Additionally, Al-Qaeda has reached out to other parts of the world and absorbed smaller factions in order to build themselves back up after the U.S. military’s campaign. Kronin states that “by becoming more populist to increase their appeal and widen their spectrum” they are isolating some of the former supports in the regions. Al-Qaeda also mainly operates underground and in secrecy. Kronin says “the more groups draw in upon themselves, because of state repression, revulsion of the public, or military successes, the more they tend to operate according to their own internal dynamics and become further removed from the public.” This undermines their very goals and their ability to operate without support.