Although much of media attention is given to Islamic State, there is another continually growing force known as Jabhat al-Nusra or the Nusra Front. In one article I read, “In Syrian Civil war, emergance of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria boosts rival Jabhat al-Nusra”, the author brings to light the increase in power and somewhat popularity of Nusra late in 2013. He illustrates that with the rise of ISIS, the extremist members and majority of foreign members of Nusra have left to join this new growing group, making Nusra appear to be more moderate, and therefore more tolerated by the public. He also explains that Nusra can now be a way for Syrians to fight against ISIS, although many are still weary about working with this group. However in an article written not a week ago, “Nusra Front Quietly Rises in Syria as Islamic State Targeted”, shows that the expansion and strengthening of Nusra has caused popularity to decrease with Syrians as the groups brutality has become more known. With IS purposefully publicizing its violent actions, many were more willing to support Nusra; however it is becoming more apparent that the group may not be any different morally. Both of these articles show how different extremist groups in this civil war have boosted and/or discredited one another. I also chose these articles because they showed another side of the Islamic fight in the revolution – that IS is not the only group who wishes for an all Islamic Syria.

Through this investigation so far, I am continually bombarded and confused by all the complexities of the Syrian civil war and what exactly “post-assad Syria” means. The causes and effects of this civil war have no short-term solution in sight. So even considering a post-Assad Syria seems irrational and unpractical at this point. Even more so, it is looking like Assad has no intentions to leave anytime soon. Al-Assad will only leave on his own terms if ever. Now of course there is the question of why doesn’t someone “take him out” or force him out. It has become apparent that al-Assad has no hesitation in reacting – in a violent way – to any threat to him or his regime. Even if by some miracle Assad does decide to leave, there are now so many groups or possible parties, creating in itself an entirely new conflict and cause of war. So it seems that now a main concern should be, if al-Assad does leave, who could be best suited to take over? Would there even be a “Syria” as it was before?

Another complexity to the matter are groups such as the Islamic State, Qatar, Iraq and other surrouding conflicts in the middle east. This civil war came from unease and disapproval of the government, and has turned into conflict of secularism, crimes against humanity, terrorism, and possible depletion of a nation. Syria has been home to numerous religious groups throughout its history, which has never been an extreme problem in the state. Now however, tensions have grown and exploded. Is this now the driving force of the revolution to focus on? There are so many sides to this and ( in my opinion) no foreseeable solution or peace in the near future. Hopefully over the next few blogs I will focus on all of these issues and come to some sort of concluding concept of this civil war.

 

Two articles that I have chosen this week are “What caused Syria’s Civil War?” – by Syrian Reverend Nadim Nassar – and “9 Questions about Syria You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask” by Max Fisher. Both of this articles give different perspectives on what started and what has fueled the Syrian conflict. I think it is important to understand this part of the story in order to comprehend how it may end. Nassar points out that the civil war begin with people wanting freedom from the Assad regime and democracy; however as the conflict grew it turned into a sectarianism fight for some groups, which has been overly covered by the world and has overshadowed what Syrians were truly after when protests began early in 2011. In Fisher’s article, he brings up two interesting theories on how the conflict began. For one he calls the ‘sectarian re-balancing’, meaning that this conflict was the inevitable outcome of diverse religious and ethnic groups forced together – by the invisible borders created by European nations – and that this conflict is a way to re-balance the powers between them. Another theory he mentions is that the Assad regime mentality and ideals are far too outdated for the modern age we live in. So it was only a matter of time until it could no longer hold its own. As both articles mention, it is difficult to ignore the fact that sectarianism as an issue has developed as the crisis has continued. This development of sectarianism is also seen when looking at the revolution development in Egypt. It began with citizen demanding removal of Mubarak to gain freedom and basic rights/needs from the suppression of the regime. However, as the revolution continued, tension and demands from groups as the Muslim Brotherhood increased. It was not long before the Brotherhood ended up taking office and Presidency in Egypt which turned the revolution into something entire new from what it started as. It is difficult to say which perspectives of globalization are being represented by these two authors, as neither particularly focus on foreign relations and the cause of Syrian Crisis. Yes Fisher does metion a theory that European intervention forcing religous and ethnic groups together could have caused the sectarian issues of the crisis. However, this is not a theory that Fisher is siding with.